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Abstract
The paper evaluates the effects of fiscal discretion in a currency area, where
a common and independent monetary authority commits to optimally set the
union-wide nominal interest rate. National governments implement fiscal pol-
icy by choosing government expenditure. The assumption of fiscal policy coor-
dination across countries is retained in order to evaluate the costs exclusively
due to discretion, leaving aside the free-riding problems stemming from non-
cooperation. In such a context, nominal rigidities potentially generate a stabi-
lization role for fiscal policy, in addition to the one of ensuring efficient provision
of public goods. However, it is showed that, under discretion, aggregate fiscal
policy stance is inefficiently loose and the volatility of government expenditure
is higher than optimal. As an implication, the optimal monetary policy rule
involves the targeting of union-wide fiscal stance, on top of inflation and output
gap. The result questions the welfare enhancing role of government expenditure,
as the proper instrument for stabilizing asymmetric shocks. In fact, discretion
entails significant welfare costs, the magnitude depending on the stochastic prop-
erties of the shocks and, for plausible parameter values, it is not optimal to use
fiscal policy as a stabilization tool.
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1 Introduction
Literature on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in currency areas is rapidly
growing. In this context, the nominal exchange rate as a shock absorbing device
is not available and, in the presence of nominal rigidities, fiscal policy is regarded
as a potentially alternative instrument to deal with asymmetric shocks. Beetsma
and Jensen (2004, 2005) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) characterize the optimal
policy mix, under the assumptions of commitment of both monetary and fiscal
policy, cooperation of fiscal authorities across countries and perfect coordination
between the central bank and national governments. Two are the main results.
Monetary policy stabilizes union average inflation and output gap. Fiscal policy
only takes care of asymmetric shocks: average government expenditure is set at
its efficient level and then is not used to stabilize the currency area as a whole.
These results constitute a useful benchmark. However, it is hard to believe
that fiscal policy is set under commitment, cooperatively across countries and
coordinating with the monetary authority. A strand of the literature tests the
robustness of optimal policy results to the assumption of fiscal cooperation. We
merely focus on the issue of fiscal discretion. Credibility and transparency have
recently become the key guidelines in the practice of central banking and they
certainly are the criteria inspiring the design of European monetary policy in-
stitutions. It is according to those principles that the European Central Bank
has been assigned by statute the primary objective to maintain price stability.
In contrast, even if within the limits imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact,
fiscal policy is conducted in a discretionary fashion by national governments,
whose tenure is limited in time and whose unique mildly binding constraints are
represented by electoral promises.
Such an asymmetry poses some questions of particular interest. First, it
is relevant to assess the effects of fiscal discretion, to investigate whether they
undermine the achievement of the stabilization goals pursued by the monetary
authority and to study the optimal response of monetary policy to potential mis-
behavior of national governments. While those issues concern a closed economy
as well as a currency area, the evaluation of welfare costs stemming from fiscal
discretion features some peculiarities that are specific to the case of a monetary
union. In fact, those costs could offset the benefits of using fiscal policy as a
stabilization tool, as an alternative to the nominal exchange rate. To answer
these questions, we modify the framework built by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) to
allow for a policy game, where the central bank commits to the optimal monetary
policy plan, taking into account that fiscal policy is acting under discretion.
The paper shows that discretionary governments generate an inefficiently
loose aggregate fiscal stance, as long as the central bank faces a short-run trade-
off. This is because the central bank and the government do not agree on the costs
and benefits associated to monetary policy actions. In particular, governments
evaluate monetary policy tightening as more recessionary. As a consequence,
they have the incentive to deviate from the full commitment solution and to gen-
erate a public spending over-expansion in the case of a negative output gap. This
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leads to higher than optimal volatility of government expenditure and, through
aggregate demand, to higher than optimal volatility either of aggregate inflation
or aggregate output gap. Hence, fiscal discretion exacerbates the stabilization
trade-off, making harder the job of the central bank in dampening union-wide
fluctuations. If the monetary authority internalizes government misbehavior, the
optimal policy rule involves the targeting of union-wide fiscal stance, on top of
inflation and output gap.
Finally, we perform welfare analysis, resorting to second order approxima-
tion to households’ lifetime utility as a welfare criterion. Not surprisingly fiscal
discretion entails welfare costs, the magnitude depending on the stochastic prop-
erties of the shocks. In particular, for some plausible parameter values, the cost
is higher than the benefit of addressing asymmetric shocks. Therefore, the model
casts some doubts on the desirability of using fiscal policy as a stabilization tool,
or at least opens the question of designing suitable institutional arrangements to
cope with the problem of discretionary governments.
2 Literature Review
Several papers study monetary and fiscal interaction, both in closed and open
economy.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) consider the case of a model where output
is sub-optimally low, as inefficiencies arising from monopolistically competitive
goods markets are not corrected by any production subsidy. The fiscal policy
objective function is assumed to be social welfare, while monetary policy is del-
egated to a central bank with an inflation target more conservative than society,
in the spirit of the proposal by Rogoff (1985). It is showed that the constrained
efficient outcome can be implemented by assigning identical objectives to policy
makers, being the output target the social optimum and the inflation target ap-
propriately conservative. Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) assume policy makers to
have the same inflation and output targets, but not necessarily the same weights,
according to an ad-hoc quadratic objective function. It is showed that output
and inflation goals can be achieved without the need for fiscal coordination across
countries and without the need for monetary commitment, irrespectively of which
authority moves first. Finally, Dixit and Lambertini (2001) show that under the
more general case of different goals and weights, the conflict of objectives pre-
vents both authorities to implement the desired outcomes. Our work differs from
those contributions in two respects. First, we assume the central bank and the
government to be benevolent, while they differ in their ability to commit to fu-
ture policies. Second, the desired outcome is not implementable, as we allow for
the presence of short-run stabilization trade-offs.
Faia (2005) studies the policy game arising in a currency area, where national
governments independently choose domestic public spending and nominal debt.
The Ramsey outcome is compared with a regime where all policy makers act
under discretion and the common central bank is assumed to move after observ-
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ing national governments’ choices. In such a context, each government realizes
both that the monetary authority has the incentive to deflate debt by loosen-
ing monetary policy and that the resulting inflation costs are shared among all
area members. This generates a free riding problem, leading to an equilibrium
characterized by higher than optimal debt, public spending and inflation. This
contribution differs from ours, as the results abstract from the presence of nom-
inal rigidities. In addition, monetary policy is not set optimally, because of the
lack of commitment on the part of the central bank.
Adam and M. Billi (2007) investigate non-cooperative monetary and fiscal
policy games in a closed economy featuring steady-state distortions under the
assumption that policymakers cannot commit to future policies. In this environ-
ment, inflation and public spending upward biases emerge as the optimal response
to the static distortions. The paper shows that appointing a central banker more
conservative than society in terms of inflation targets improves steady-state wel-
fare, at the small cost of generating some stabilization biases, arising because of
departures from the assumption of benevolent policy makers. The authors also
compute the optimal inflation rate, defined as the one that would be chosen by
a Ramsey planner internalizing that fiscal variables are chosen in a discretionary
fashion. That optimal inflation rate is conceptually the same as the one derived
in our model. However, only its steady-state value is computed while we are
interested in characterizing its state-contingent path. This is because we want
to focus on the optimal monetary policy response to shocks under fiscal discre-
tion. Moreover, our analysis is performed within a linear-quadratic framework
without steady-state distortions. This allows to derive an explicit targeting rule
specifying how the objectives of the central bank optimally relate to each other.
Finally, contributions by Sargent and Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991) and
Woodford (2001) gave rise to an important strand of the literature that char-
acterizes the optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix leaving aside coordination
problems, by assuming that all policy variables are chosen by a unique author-
ity. A representative, though not exhaustive, sample includes Ferrero (2005),
Lambertini (2006), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004, 2007) together with the authors cited above, Beetsma and Jensen (2004,
2005) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005).
3 The Private Sector Equilibrium
The currency union is represented by a continuum of infinitely many countries
indexed by i on the unit interval [0,1]. Each country is a small open econ-
omy whereas the union as a whole is assumed to be a closed economic system.
The members of the currency area have symmetric preferences and are ex-ante
identical in terms of technology and market structure, but they are subject to
asymmetric shocks. Each economy is populated by infinitely many households
and firms interacting on goods, labor and asset markets. Goods markets are
imperfectly competitive and prices are set in staggered contracts with random
4
duration. Labor markets are monopolistically competitive and labor mobility
across countries is ruled out. Moreover, the wage mark-up is assumed to fluc-
tuate exogenously around its mean value in order to create a meaningful policy
trade-off at the union-wide level. Financial markets are complete and the law of
one price is assumed to hold.
Monetary policy is in charge to set the union-wide nominal interest rate, while
fiscal policy is responsible for choosing government expenditure and taxes. It is
assumed for simplicity that the static distortion due to imperfect competition
on goods and labor markets is undone by means of subsidies, while lump-sum
taxes and transfers are available and they adjust so as to balance the government
budget constraint at all times.
It is described next the private sector equilibrium as a function of monetary
and fiscal policy.
3.1 Households
Each household in country i consumes a continuum of private and public goods
and sells differentiated labor services to firms. Preferences are described by a
utility function defined over private consumption, public expenditure and leisure
U i0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(1− χ)logCit + χlogGit −
(N it )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
(3.1)
Cit is a composite consumption good defined as
Cit =
(Cii,t)
1−α(CiF,t)
α
(1− α)(1−α)αα (3.2)
where Cii,t is a CES aggregator of domestically produced varieties
Cii,t =
[∫ 1
0
Cii,t(j)
p−1
p dj
] p
p−1
(3.3)
Cii,t(j) denotes the quantity consumed of variety j produced in country i and p
is the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in the same country.
CiF,t is domestic consumption of imported varieties from the other members of
the currency area
CiF,t = exp
∫ 1
0
logCif,tdf (3.4)
and it is in turn a function of an aggregator combining all varieties j produced
in each foreign country f
Cif,t =
[∫ 1
0
cif,t(j)
p−1
p dj
] p
p−1
(3.5)
5
The parameter α can be interpreted as a measure either of home bias in private
consumption or of opennes towards the rest of country members.1
Defining for each country i the aggregate price index of domestically produced
goods (i.e. the producer price index) as
P it =
[∫ 1
0
P it (j)
1−pdj
] 1
1−p
(3.6)
the union wide price index as
P ∗t = exp
∫ 1
0
logP ft df (3.7)
and the consumer price index for each country i
P ic,t = (P
i
t )
1−α (P ∗t )
α (3.8)
optimal intra-temporal allocation among varieties implies the following equa-
tions2
Cii,t(j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−p
Cii,t (3.9)
P ft C
i
f,t = P
∗
t C
i
F,t (3.10)
P itC
i
i,t = (1− α)P ic,tCit P ∗t C∗F,t = αP ic,tCit (3.11)
Given optimal allocation of expenditure, the period budget constraint can be
written as
P ic,tC
i
t + Et
{
Qt,t+1D
i
t+1
} ≤ Dit + (1 + τw)W itN it + T it (3.12)
W itN
i
t is nominal labor income, τ
i
w is a proportional subsidy to labor income
and T it are lump-sum taxes. In addition, households hold a portfolio that is
including state contingent assets and shares in foreign and domestic firms. Dit+1
denotes the nominal payoff of the portfolio in t+1, Qt,t+1 is the one-period ahead
stochastic discount factor and it is such that Et{Qt,t+1}R∗t = 1, where R∗t is the
risk-free nominal interest rate factor of the currency area.
Labor services offered by households are regarded by firms as imperfect substi-
tutes, where the elasticity of substitution is equal to w > 1. As in the standard
1As long as α < 1, because of the home bias, countries are consuming different consumption
bundles. As a consequence, CPI inflation differentials may arise even if the law of one price is assumed
to hold. Were absent the home bias, one would observe producer price inflation differentials only.
2Price indexes P it , P
∗
t and P
i
c,t are defined so that the minimum cost of consumption bundles C
i
i,t,
CiF,t and C
i
t are respectively P
i
tC
i
i,t, P
∗
t C
i
F,t, and P
i
c,tC
i
t . Moreover, P
i
tC
i
i,t + P
∗
t C
i
F,t = P
i
c,tC
i
t .
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monopolistic competition set up, total labor demand faced by each household is
given by
N it (h) =
[
W it (h)
W it
]−w
N it (3.13)
where
N it =
[∫ 1
0
N it (h)
w−1
w dh
] w
w−1
(3.14)
is the aggregate labor index combining in the Dixit-Stiglitz from the total quan-
tity sold of each variety and
W it =
[∫ 1
0
(
W it (h)
)1−w
dh
] 1
1−w
(3.15)
can be interpreted as the aggregate wage, defined so that the minimum cost of
the aggregate labor index
∫ 1
0 N
i
t (h)W
i
t (h)dh is W
i
tN
i
t .
Utility maximization subject to the period budget constraints and labor demand
yields the standard optimality conditions3
Cit(N
i
t )
ϕ = (1− χ)W
i
t
P ic,t
(3.16)
β
(
Cit
Cit+1
)(
P ic,t
P ic,t+1
)
= Qt,t+1 (3.17)
In order to introduce a tension between inflation and output gap stabilization, it
is assumed from now on that the wage mark-up fluctuates exogenously around its
mean value4. Hence, equation (3.16) is modified accordingly to include a random
shock
exp{µwt }Cit(N it )ϕ = (1− χ)
W it
P ic,t
(3.18)
µw,it follows an autoregressive process represented by
µw,it+1 = ρuµ
w,i
t + ε
i
t+1,u (3.19)
where εit,u is white noise with standard deviation denoted by σε,u. ε
i
t,u and ε
j
t,u
are assumed to be uncorrelated for all t and for all i 6= j.
After rewriting (3.17) as a conventional Euler equation
βR∗tEt
{(
Cit
Cit+1
)(
P ic,t
P ic,t+1
)}
= 1 (3.20)
3The wage equation already takes into account that the subsidy to labor income is set so as to
offset market power
4The assumption could be rationalized by any real or nominal friction in the wage contracting
process. See also Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), Gal´ı (2003) and Woodford (2003)
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complete financial markets imply the following international risk sharing condi-
tion5
Cit = C
f
t (S
i
f,t)
1−α (3.21)
where Sif,t stands for the bilateral terms of trade between any country i and f
and it is defined as
Sif,t =
P ft
P it
so that the effective terms of trade of any country i against the rest of the
currency area are
Sit =
P ∗t
P it
(3.22)
= exp
∫ 1
0
(logP ft − logP it ) df
= exp
∫ 1
0
logSif,t df
Note finally that the terms of trade can be related to CPI by
P ic,t = P
i
t (S
i
t)
α (3.23)
this implying the following relation between CPI and domestic inflation
piic,t = pi
i
t + α∆s
i
t (3.24)
3.2 Firms
Each country is populated by a continuum of firms indexed by j on the unit
interval [0, 1], each producing a variety with a constant return to scale technology
Y it (j) = A
i
tN
i
t (j) (3.25)
Country-specific productivity is denoted by Ait and follows an autoregressive
process represented by
logAit+1 = ρalogA
i
t + ε
i
t+1,a (3.26)
where εit is white noise with standard deviation σε,a. ε
i
t and ε
j
t are assumed to
be uncorrelated for all t and all i 6= j.
5(3.21) holds under the assumption of symmetric initial conditions and initial zero net foreign asset
holdings.
8
Prices are staggered a` la Calvo, then in every period firms face a constant prob-
ability θ of changing the price. The optimal (log) price charged by firms that are
allowed to re-optimize in period t is6
pit = µ+ (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
{
mcit+k + p
i
t+k
}
(3.27)
where µ = log pp−1 is the log of the optimal mark-up. mct stands for the log of
the marginal cost and is equal to
mcit = −log(1− τ ip) + wit − pit − ait + µw,it (3.28)
and τ ip is a proportional production subsidy. Finally, it can be easily shown that
the aggregate production function is given by
Y it Z
i
t = A
i
tN
i
t (3.29)
where Zit is defined as
Zit =
∫ 1
0
Y it (j)
Yt
dj (3.30)
and represents a measure of relative price dispersion7.
3.3 Government Expenditure
Define aggregate government expenditure as
Git =
[∫ 1
0
Git(j)
p−1
p dj
] p
p−1
(3.31)
where Git(j) is the quantity of public consumption of variety j. Note that, dif-
ferently from households, government is assumed to consume only domestically
produced goods.8 Given Git, the government chooses G
i
t(j) so as to minimize
expenditure. Hence the following condition has to be satisfied
Git(j) =
(
P it (j)
P it
)−p
Git (3.32)
6To a first order approximation.
7It can be proved that log(Z) is a function of the cross sectional variance of relative prices and it
is of second order.
8The assumption that the government consumes domestically produced goods only is not as strong
as it may look like: the empirical evidence in fact is in favor of a considerably higher home bias in
public consumption than private consumption.
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3.4 Market Clearing
After defining aggregate output as
Y it =
[∫ 1
0
Y it (j)
p−1
p dj
] p
p−1
(3.33)
one can show that the clearing of all goods markets, along with conditions for
optimal intra-temporal allocation among varieties9, implies that
Y it = A
i
tN
i
t = C
i
t(S
i
t)
α +Git (3.34)
3.5 The Pareto Optimum
The Pareto efficient equilibrium is determined by solving the problem of a planner
who wishes to maximize utility of the union as a whole∫ 1
0
U(Cit , N
i
t , G
i
t)di (3.35)
subject to technology and resource constraints
Y it = A
i
tN
i
t (3.36)
Y it = C
i
i,t +
∫ 1
0
Cfi,tdf +G
i
t (3.37)
for all i ∈ [0, 1] The corresponding first order conditions determine the following
efficient outcome for country i
N
i
t = 1; Y
i
t = A
i
t; C
i
t = (1− χ)(1− α)(Ait)1−α(A∗t )α; Git = χAit (3.38)
Aggregating over i yields the union-wide Pareto optimum
N
∗
t = 1; Y
∗
t = A
∗
t ; C
∗
t = (1− χ)A∗t ; G∗t = χA∗t (3.39)
The evolution of the terms of trade at an efficient equilibrium has to be
S
i
t =
(
C
i
t
C
∗
t
) 1
1−α
=
Ait
A∗t
(3.40)
9For further details see Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005).
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3.6 Equilibrium Dynamics
As efficiency will constitute the benchmark for welfare analysis, it is convenient to
describe the equilibrium dynamics in terms of deviation from first best outcomes.
Let output, government expenditure and fiscal gaps be respectively defined as
y˜t = yt − yt; g˜t = gt − gt; f˜t = g˜t − y˜t; (3.41)
f˜t can be interpreted as the percentage deviation from efficiency of government
expenditure, as a fraction of GDP. The steady state of the model coincides with
the first best steady state because of two reasons. First, fiscal policy is assumed
to subsidize production to undo the static distortion induced by monopolistic
competition in the goods markets. The absence of distortionary taxation allows
to restore static efficiency. Moreover, the choice of the subsidy is not influenced
by the desire of manipulating terms of trade in a country’s favor. This is because
fiscal policy is assumed to be set cooperatively across countries.
One can show that country i’s inflation and output gap are fully described by
the following equations (in log deviations from the efficient steady state)
piit = βEt{piit+1}+ λ(1 + ϕ)y˜it − λ
χ
1− χf˜
i
t + λµ
w,i
t (3.42)
∆y˜it −∆y˜∗t =
χ
1− χ(∆f˜
i
t −∆f˜∗t )− [(piit − pi∗t ) + (∆ait −∆a∗t )] (3.43)
as a function of domestic fiscal policy {f˜ it}, given productivity differentials and
the evolution of union-wide inflation and output gap, where the following defini-
tions apply
pi∗t =
∫ 1
0
piitdi y˜
∗
t =
∫ 1
0
y˜itdi f˜
∗
t =
∫ 1
0
f˜ itdi (3.44)
and λ is a convolution of deep parameters
λ =
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
Equation (3.43) is peculiar to the case of a currency area. It relates the evolution
of output gap differentials to fiscal gap, inflation and productivity differentials.
In particular, note that ∆ait−∆a∗t is the efficient change in the terms of trade. As
in a monetary union the nominal exchange rate cannot adjust so as to keep the
terms of trade at their efficient level, price stickiness implies that each country
can increase its own output gap relatively to the average, by creating deflation
and then pushing the terms of trade above their efficient level. Hence, other
things equal, devaluations of the real exchange rate increase domestic output
gap through a beggar thy neighbor policy.
Finally, after specifying a monetary policy rule, the equilibrium of the cur-
rency area as a whole can be determined using union-wide versions of the stan-
dard closed-economy Phillips and IS curves
pi∗t = βEt{pi∗t+1}+ λ(1 + ϕ)y˜∗t − λ
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t + λµ
w,∗
t (3.45)
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y˜∗t = Ety˜
∗
t+1 +
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t −
χ
1− χEtf˜
∗
t+1 − (r∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − rr∗t ) (3.46)
where rr∗t is a function of TFP shocks
rr∗t = ρ+ Et{∆a∗t+1} (3.47)
4 The Policy Problem
A second order approximation to the sum of utilities of union households around
the efficient steady-state yields
W = −1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫ 1
0
(
p
λ
(piit)
2 + (1 + ϕ)(y˜it)
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
i
t )
2
)
di (4.1)
Nominal rigidities, cost push disturbances and the asymmetry of shocks make it
impossible to attain the Pareto efficient allocation. Therefore, the question of
how to design monetary and fiscal policy rules is a non-trivial issue.
Following Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005), we solve the model by applying
Aoki (1981) factorization of the variables into averages and differences from the
average. As countries are ex-ante symmetric and of equal size, the factorization
allows to split the full optimization programs of both authorities into a currency
area part and a relative part, completely independent from each other. Defining
country i inflation, output gap and fiscal gap differentials
pidit = pi
i
t − pi∗t f˜dit = f˜ it − f˜∗t y˜dit = y˜it − y˜∗t (4.2)
the welfare function (4.1) and the constraints (3.42), (3.43), (3.44) and (3.46)
can be rewritten as
W =W ∗ +W d (4.3)
pi∗t = βEt{pi∗t+1}+ λ(1 + ϕ)y˜∗t − λ
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t + λµ
w,∗
t (4.4)
y˜∗t = Ety˜
∗
t+1 +
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t −
χ
1− χEtf˜
∗
t+1 − (r∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − rr∗t ) (4.5)
pidit = βEt{pidit+1}+ λ(1 + ϕ)y˜dit − λ
χ
1− χf˜
di
t + λ(µ
w,i
t − µw,∗t ) (4.6)
∆y˜dit =
χ
1− χ∆f˜
di
t − [pidit + (∆ait −∆a∗t )] (4.7)∫ 1
0
pidit di = 0
∫ 1
0
y˜dit di = 0
∫ 1
0
f˜dit di = 0 (4.8)
where
W ∗ = −1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
p
λ
(pi∗t )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(y˜∗t )
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
∗
t )
2
)
(4.9)
W d = −1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫ 1
0
(
p
λ
(pidit )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(y˜dit )
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
di
t )
2
)
di (4.10)
To retrieve country-i variables, it is sufficient to apply (4.2).
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5 Perfect Coordination
Before studying monetary and fiscal policy interaction, it is useful to look as a
benchmark at the case of perfect coordination, where the two authorities share
the same objectives and operate under the same regime. We first recall the full
commitment solution for the currency area as a whole, derived by Gal´ı and Mona-
celli (2005). Then, we derive the policy mix under discretion. It is interesting to
note that, under both regimes, it is completely indifferent whether monetary and
fiscal policy are chosen by a single authority or simultaneously chosen by two in-
dependent authorities that are taking as given the policy instrument of the other.
These findings are reminiscent of the ones by Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and
Adam and M. Billi (2007), even though in the context of a different model. The
crucial assumption driving the result is that there is not any disagreement about
the targets and about the costs and benefits associated to policy actions.
The optimal policy under commitment for the currency area is defined by a
rule for the fiscal gap {f˜∗t } and the union-wide nominal interest rate {r∗t } that
maximize (4.9) subject to (4.4)10. The optimal policy mix implies
λ−1ppi∗t + λ
−1∆y˜∗t = 0 (5.1)
f˜∗t = −y˜∗t (5.2)
(5.1) and (5.2) define the second best, or equivalently the constrained efficient
allocation in terms of union-wide variables.
Under discretion policy makers do not choose once and for all the state-
contingent path of policy instruments, they are rather allowed to re-optimize in
every period. As a consequence, they do not take into account the impact of
current choices on past variables through the expectation channel. The resulting
policy mix is
λ−1ppi∗t + λ
−1y˜∗t = 0 (5.3)
f˜∗t = −y˜∗t (5.4)
Equations (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4) correspond exactly to the standard rules
that would characterize a closed economy sharing preferences and technology of
the union’s member countries. The features of optimal monetary policy and its
advantages over a discretionary regime are well known facts in the literature.
However, it may be useful to recall that (5.1) and (5.3) differ because the lat-
ter overlooks the marginal gain of committing to future deflations in terms of
current output gap, λ−1y˜∗t , which is in fact appearing lagged one period in (5.1)
but not in (5.3). In the event of an adverse cost-push shock, committed policy
makers can contain inflationary pressures though a lower interest rate increase
(a lower output contraction), simply by announcing future higher rates (lower
future inflation). Through this mechanism, it is possible to smooth the impact
of the shock over time. Such a policy is not time consistent and then it cannot
10The IS equation, (4.5), can be implemented ex-post, by choosing the interest rate consistently
with optimal inflation, output and fiscal gaps
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be implemented under discretion, as it would not be credible. It follows that dis-
cretionary policy makers would evaluate the policy tightening implemented by a
committed authority in the face of an adverse cost-push shock as too recessionary.
In addition, some interesting conclusions about fiscal policy can be drawn.
First, (5.2) implies
g˜∗t = 0 (5.5)
Hence, in the optimal policy mix, government expenditure is set to its first best
level, or equivalently, fiscal policy is not used as a stabilization tool. Therefore,
the central bank is the only responsible for addressing aggregate fluctuations.
This is due to the asymmetry of costs associated to the use of the policy instru-
ments. The absence of transaction frictions allows to vary the nominal interest
rate, without generating welfare costs. On the contrary, fluctuations in gov-
ernment expenditure are costly, as they imply a departure from efficient public
goods provision.
In addition, under perfect coordination, irrespectively of the policy regime,
(5.5) still holds. Hence, discretion per se does not produce inefficiency losses in
public goods provision. This ceases to be true when monetary policy optimally
reacts to governments’ lack of commitment, as it will be clear in the following
sections.
6 Optimal Monetary Policy under Fiscal Dis-
cretion
We turn now to the case where monetary and fiscal policy are conducted by two
independent authorities, sharing the same objectives. Only the latter is able
to credibly commit to future policies, while the fiscal policy maker chooses the
fiscal gap sequentially, i.e. she solves the policy problem in each period, in order
to determine the current instrument only. Because of the lack of commitment,
the government cannot directly control future fiscal gaps. As a consequence, the
impact of current actions on past expectations is not internalized. Being private
sector forward looking, this is costly as long as policy choices are subject to time
inconsistency problems. As in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), we model strategic
interaction as a Stackelberg game. The committed authority, the central bank
in our case, is assumed to be the leader, while fiscal policy is the follower. As
such, the latter takes the union-wide nominal interest rate as given in each period
and the IS equation is perceived to be a constraint imposed by monetary policy.
The model is solved by backward induction: after solving for the fiscal rule
of the government, the central bank determines at time zero the optimal state
contingent path of output, inflation and fiscal gaps, taking into account the fiscal
policy reaction function. In the remainder of the section, we first define the policy
game. Then, we characterize the equilibrium of the currency area as a whole and
of the representative country. We refer to the appendix for derivations.
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Definition 6.1 Discretionary fiscal policy is defined as the solution to the fol-
lowing problems. The currency area problem consists in selecting a fiscal policy
rule for the union-wide fiscal gap {f˜∗t }∞t=0 maximizing (4.9) subject to (4.4) and
(4.5), given the union-wide nominal interest rate and the exogenous stochastic
processes. Finally, optimization of the welfare function (4.10) subject to (4.6),
(4.7) and (4.8) determines the state-contingent path of fiscal gap differentials
{f˜dit }∞t=0, for all i ∈ [0, 1]
Before defining the monetary policy problem, observe that fiscal policy fully de-
termines inflation, output and fiscal gap differentials. The result reflects the fact
that monetary policy does not have enough instruments to stabilize fluctuations
of single country variables. Two are the main implications. First, given the
constraints imposed by national governments, the central bank has one degree of
freedom to choose the union-wide policy rule, but she does not have any leverage
on differentials. Equivalently, the monetary authority has to solve the union-wide
part of the optimization program, while the relative part is determined by the
constraints. Second, there is no strategic interaction, and then no policy game,
as far as single country stabilization issues are concerned. The solution to the
relative part of the fiscal optimization problem is completely irrelevant for the
policy game, which in turns determines currency area equilibrium only.
Definition 6.2 Optimal monetary policy under fiscal discretion is defined as
the state contingent path for the common interest rate {r∗t }, together with the
associated union-wide policy outcomes, {pi∗t }, {y˜∗t } and {f˜∗t } maximizing welfare
(4.9) subject to (4.4) and the union-wide fiscal rule.
6.1 Union-wide Equilibrium
The union-wide fiscal policy rule is
f˜∗t = −y˜∗t − ϕ(y˜∗t + ppi∗t ) (6.1)
while the targeting rule of the central bank is
ppi
∗
t +∆y˜
∗
t = χ(1 + ϕpλ)(f˜
∗
t + y˜
∗
t )− χ(f˜∗t−1 + y˜∗t−1) (6.2)
The equilibrium of the currency area as a whole is fully described by the rules
(6.1) and (6.2), together with the union-wide Phillips curve (4.4). A comparison
of (6.1) and (6.2) with the rules characterizing the case of perfect coordination
allows to gain some important economic insights:
• As it has been stressed in section 5, governments evaluate policy tightening
as more recessionary than a central bank who is able to manipulate expec-
tations. The disagreement about the costs and benefits associated to mon-
etary policy actions generates inefficient public spending over-expansion in
case of negative output gaps. Therefore, fiscal policy exacerbates the trade-
off faced by the monetary authority as long as she is also concerned about
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fiscal gap stabilization. Note that if the central bank behaves in a discre-
tionary fashion, the deviation of government expenditure from its commit-
ment level vanishes11. A committed central bank could still set the nominal
interest rate so as to eliminate completely government over-reaction. How-
ever, she should accept the inflation and output gap variability associated
to full discretion. This would not be optimal and a combination of positive
inflation, output and fiscal gap variability is preferred.
• Optimal monetary policy involves the targeting of fiscal gap deviations
from the full commitment (second best) level. In particular, coherently
with the reaction function of the government, higher deviations call for
higher inflation or higher output gap. This allows the central bank to
reduce government over-reaction. Moreover, if the government does not
deviate from the full commitment solution, the monetary policy rule (6.2)
converges to (5.1).
• As in the standard case, optimal monetary policy under fiscal discretion is
inertial: the lagged fiscal gap appears in the targeting rule. Then, for given
future fiscal gaps, the central bank commits to tighten future monetary
policy in the event of an increase of the current fiscal gap above its second
best level. This improves the current trade-off between inflation and fiscal
gap stabilization by reducing expected future inflation.
• In the absence of cost-push shocks, the full commitment solution can be
implemented even in the case of fiscal discretion. Keeping inflation and
output at their natural level eliminates any incentive of over-expansion on
the part of the government. In fact, absent any short-run stabilization
trade-off, time inconsistency is not an issue as the efficient allocation is
feasible.
Finally, note that the equilibrium evolution of the currency area as a whole is
exactly the same that would be observed in a closed economy sharing preferences
and technology of the union’s member countries. Hence, from now on, all starred
variables can be interpreted either as union-wide or closed economy variables.
6.2 Equilibrium in The Representative Country
The representative country part of the problem is more involved than the case of
the currency area, as the lagged values of fiscal and output gap appear in equation
(4.7). This means that expectations of future variables cannot be taken as given.
In fact, even restricting to Markov strategies, one has to take into account that in
any stationary equilibrium expectations of future states will depend on their own
lags. To solve the model we use the same method as Clarida et al. (1999) and
11It can also be proved that in such a case the Lagrange multiplier attached to the IS equation in
the fiscal policy problem is equal to zero. This is because, despite the lack of coordination there is no
disagreement between the two authorities so that monetary policy does not impose any constraint on
fiscal policy
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Beetsma and Jensen (2004, 2005). What has to be taken as given is how private
sector expectations react to current policy, rather than expectations. Hence,
we conjecture that expectations are a linear function of current states for some
arbitrary coefficients. Those coefficients are defined to be such to coincide with
the parameters entering the state space representation of the rational expectation
equilibrium 12. We refer to the appendix for all technical details and we report
below the fiscal policy rule for country i
ϕpλpi
di
t + (1 + ϕ)(d1 − λϕ)y˜dit + (1 + ϕ)d1f˜dit = (6.3)
βEt
[
ϕpλpi
di
t+1 + (1 + ϕ)y˜
di
t+1 + f˜t+1
]
where
d1 = 1 + β(1− c1) + λ(1 + ϕ) (6.4)
and c1 is a state space coefficient defined in the appendix. It is immediate to see
that the fiscal policy rule is entirely forward looking. This is because, due to the
lack of commitment, the government fails to internalize the effect of policy on
past expectations.
7 Impulse Responses and Second Moments
7.1 The Currency Area
Let each country be subject to cost-push shocks following the process (3.19).
Aggregating across countries and applying the definition µw,∗t =
∫ 1
0 µ
w,i
t di yields
µw,∗t+1 = ρuµ
w,∗
t + ε
∗
t+1,u (7.1)
where ε∗t,u =
∫ 1
0 ε
i
t,udi is white noise with standard deviation denoted by σε,u.
Given the stochastic process (7.1), equations (6.1), (6.2) and the union-wide
Phillips curve allow to compute the impulse response functions of starred vari-
ables. They can be interpreted either as the response of a closed economy or
as the response of the currency area to a shock hitting every member country
i. Structural parameters are the same as in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and they
are reported in Table 1. ϕ is set equal to 3, implying a labor supply elasticity
of 1/3. The elasticity of substitution among goods and labor types, p and w
are equal to 6, which is consistent with average mark-ups of 20 percent. θ and
β are respectively set to 0.75 and 0.99. The steady-state share of government
spending in output, γ = χ, is parameterized to 0.25, the average of final govern-
ment consumption for the euro zone. TFP standard deviation is calibrated to
the conventional value 0.0071. Two alternative calibrations for serial correlation
have been chosen: ρu = 0.95 and ρu = 0. Figures 1 and 2 display the response of
12This is a conventional fixed point problem that can be easily solved either via undetermined
coefficients or through some recursive numerical method.
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output gap, fiscal gap and inflation to a cost-push shock, under the two regimes
of full commitment and discretionary fiscal policy. Table 2 and 3 report percent-
age standard deviations of inflation, output, fiscal and government expenditure
gaps. We normalize to one the relative standard deviation of the cost-push shock
with respect to TFP. Sensitivity analysis of welfare to changes in the standard
deviation and the serial correlation are postponed to section 8. Some features
are worth to be stressed:
• Under fiscal discretion, the fiscal gap response to cost-push shocks is sig-
nificantly stronger. The volatility of public spending translates through
aggregate demand into higher than optimal volatility either of aggregate
inflation or aggregate output gap. Fluctuations in the fiscal gap can only be
dampened either by tolerating more volatile inflation or by over-stabilizing
the output gap. Which option is preferred by the central bank depends on
the persistence of the shock. As suggested by Table 2 and 3, the first one
is preferred when the serial correlation of the shock is high.
• Although the fiscal rule targets contemporaneous variables, monetary policy
can induce inertia by suitably choosing her policy instrument. In fact, the
central bank has a first mover advantage over the government, who takes
monetary policy as given. This is evident from Figure 2, showing the case
of serially uncorrelated cost-push shocks.
• Comparing Figures 1 and 2, it is immediate to see that higher serial cor-
relation magnifies fiscal policy over-reaction to a negative cost push shock,
implying persistently higher inflation.
7.2 The Representative Country
As it has been previously stressed, there is no strategic interaction at the country
level: fiscal policy is ”alone” in the task of addressing asymmetric shocks. This
meaning that our discretionary fiscal policy is the same as in Beetsma and Jensen
(2004, 2005). In fact, our results are in line with theirs, even if the first order
conditions are not directly comparable. Figures 3 and 4 report impulse responses
to TFP and cost-push shocks respectively. Serial correlation of both shocks is set
to 0.95. Note that the response of country-i variables and of differentials from
the union-average coincide in the case of a country-specific shock with zero mass,
as union-wide variables are unaffected. This is not the case when all countries
are simultaneously hit by shocks.
In the absence of nominal rigidities, asymmetric shocks to productivity would
require the terms of trade to adjust in order to keep output and public spending
at their first best level. However, when prices are sticky inflation fluctuations
are costly and it is optimal to smooth price changes over time, by allowing a
temporary departure of output from efficiency. In the transition to the steady
state, an expansionary fiscal policy reduces the cost in terms of output, both
under discretion and commitment. However, under discretion the effect of the
18
shock on prices is persistently stronger, since the government cannot control
expectations to improve current stabilization trade-offs. On the other hand,
output and fiscal gaps are less volatile than optimal.
In the case of a cost-push shock, fiscal stance is tightened. Monetary policy
cannot stabilize national business cycles and government expenditure is the only
available instrument to address the distortions induced by sticky prices and inef-
ficient fluctuations in the wage mark-up. Therefore, it is not possible to close all
the gaps: national governments have to choose a combination of positive inflation
and negative output gap. As a consequence, the fiscal gap has to fall in order
to counteract inflationary pressures, by contracting aggregate demand. Again,
under commitment the fiscal authority manipulates private sector expectations
in order to improve the trade-off at the time the shock hits the economy. On the
contrary, a discretionary government generates on impact more volatile responses
to shocks. Moreover, prices, output gap and fiscal gap are higher than optimal
during the transition to the steady state.
Table 4 and 5 report percentage standard deviations of differentials: the lack
of commitment worsens inflation stabilization so much that the fiscal author-
ity is induced to stabilize output and fiscal gap more than optimally. Hence,
discretionary fiscal policy is less active than it should. The result does not con-
tradict the fact that the fiscal stance is inefficiently loose at the currency area
level. As all governments are over-reacting to shocks, the union-wide fiscal gap
is fluctuating too much, while fiscal gap differentials are fluctuating too little.
8 Welfare Analysis
Recent literature claims that, in a currency area, a committed fiscal policy en-
hances welfare through the stabilization of asymmetric shocks. After evaluating
the costs generated by fiscal discretion, we ask whether the result survives when
governments act in a discretionary fashion, without coordinating with the cen-
tral bank. We compute welfare as a function of serial correlation and of relative
standard deviation of the cost-push shock. All welfare differences across regimes
are measured in consumption equivalents, i.e. the percentage variation of steady
state consumption under the benchmark policy that is making agents indifferent
to the alternative policy regime.
Figure 5 plots the contour sets of the cost generated by discretion, with re-
spect to full commitment. Not surprisingly, discretion entails welfare costs. This
is due to two reasons: on one hand, the union-wide fiscal gap is too volatile, mak-
ing harder the job of the central bank in stabilizing inflation and output gap. On
the other hand, discretion leads to sub-optimal fluctuations of inflation, output
and fiscal gap differentials. The relative importance of the two components is
assessed in Figure 6, displaying the fraction of the total cost due to inefficient
union-wide fluctuations. Note that this is the least important part of the cost
(always less than a half). The intuition is that, while monetary policy can at least
partially cope with fiscal misbehavior at the union level, there is no possibility
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to influence single country variables and then the behavior of differentials.
Given the cost stemming from fiscal discretion, it is interesting to ask whether
it is sensible to use public spending as an instrument to stabilize national busi-
ness cycles, rather than confining governments to the role of efficiently providing
public goods. To answer this question, we compare welfare under full commit-
ment and under fiscal discretion against the case of inactive fiscal policy, meaning
expenditure set at its efficient level at all times. Figure 7 plots the welfare gain
of the full commitment solution. The stabilizing role of fiscal policy always gen-
erates welfare gains, the magnitude depending on the stochastic properties of
the shocks. Figure 8 displays welfare differences between the fiscal discretion
regime and the case of inactive fiscal policy. Such differences can be decomposed
into two parts. The first is always negative and captures the cost arising from
the fact that the fiscal stance is inefficiently loose at the union level. The second
component measures differences due to fluctuations in inflation, output and fiscal
gap differentials: it can be positive or negative, depending whether the welfare
improving role of fiscal policy survives to discretion. Figures 9 and 10 show the
two components. For most of parameter combinations, the only cost imposed
by fiscal discretion is represented by excessive fiscal gap variability at the union
level. But, interestingly, for some parameter combinations, even the positive role
of fiscal policy in stabilizing asymmetric shocks is compromised by the inability
of steering inflation expectations due to lack of commitment.
Overall, welfare analysis casts some doubt, at least for some plausible cali-
brations of parameters, on the desirability of using fiscal policy to address asym-
metric shocks.
9 Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix in a currency area,
where only the central bank is able to commit to future policies. The contribution
of the paper is twofold. First, we show that the optimal reaction on the part
of monetary policy to fiscal discretion involves the targeting of union-wide fiscal
stance, on top of inflation and output gap stabilization. Moreover, we perform
welfare analysis and we find that the costs generated by discretion may offset
the benefits of using fiscal policy for stabilization purposes. In those cases, it
is welfare enhancing to confine governments to the role of efficiently providing
public goods. The result opens the question of designing a suitable institutional
framework coping with the problem of fiscal discretion.
The issue deserves further theoretical and empirical investigation. In partic-
ular, some relevant distortions the paper is abstracting from could push welfare
results in opposite directions, either strengthening or weakening our argument. In
fact, on one hand the introduction of distortionary taxation and debt may worsen
the effects of discretionary fiscal policy as emphasized by Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2006). In this perspective, our analysis would just provide a lower bound of
the costs generated by the lack of commitment on the fiscal side. On the other
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hand, transaction frictions would reduce the cost of using public spending as a
stabilization instrument, relatively to the nominal interest rate. This provides a
motive for the use of government expenditure as a union-wide stabilization tool,
even under full commitment.
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A Appendix Perfect Coordination
Defining country i inflation, output gap and fiscal gap differentials
pidit = pi
i
t − pi∗t f˜dit = f˜ it − f˜∗t y˜dit = y˜it − y˜∗t (A.1)
the welfare function (4.1) and the constraints (3.42), (3.43), (3.44) and (3.46)
can be rewritten as
W =W ∗ +W d (A.2)
pi∗t = βEt{pi∗t+1}+ λ(1 + ϕ)y˜∗t − λ
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t + λµ
w,∗
t (A.3)
y˜∗t = Ety˜
∗
t+1 +
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t −
χ
1− χEtf˜
∗
t+1 − (r∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − rr∗t ) (A.4)
pidit = βEt{pidit+1}+ λ(1 + ϕ)y˜dit − λ
χ
1− χf˜
di
t + λ(µ
w,i
t − µw,∗t ) (A.5)
∆y˜dit =
χ
1− χ∆f˜
di
t − [pidit + (∆ait −∆a∗t )] (A.6)
∫ 1
0
pidit di = 0
∫ 1
0
y˜dit di = 0
∫ 1
0
f˜dit di = 0 (A.7)
where
W ∗ = −1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
p
λ
(pi∗t )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(y˜∗t )
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
∗
t )
2
)
+ tips (A.8)
W d = −1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
∫ 1
0
(
p
λ
(pidit )
2 + (1 + ϕ)(y˜dit )
2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
di
t )
2
)
di+ tips (A.9)
Concerning the optimal policy mix under commitment for the currency area as
a whole we simply refer to Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005).
We solve the currency area optimization problem under discretion by restricting
to Markov perfect equilibria. Since the problem does not involve endogenous
state variables, future variables are functions of future exogenous states only.
As a consequence, a discretionary government that cannot manipulate private
beliefs has to take expectations as given. Therefore, the currency area problem
reduces to a sequence of static problems. Maximizing (A.8) subject to (A.3) with
respect to inflation, output and fiscal gaps yields
p
λ
pi∗t + ν
∗
pi,t = 0 (A.10)
(1 + ϕ)y˜∗t − λ(1 + ϕ)ν∗pi,t = 0 (A.11)
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t + λ
χ
1− χν
∗
pi,t = 0 (A.12)
Combining (A.10)-(A.12) the policy rules (5.3) and (5.4) can be easily obtained.
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B Appendix: The Discretionary Fiscal Pol-
icy Problem
The fiscal policy problem can be split in two independent parts. The currency
area problem consists in selecting a fiscal policy rule for the union-wide fiscal
gap {f˜∗t }∞t=0 maximizing (A.8) subject to (A.3) and (A.4), given the union-wide
nominal interest rate and the exogenous stochastic processes. Finally, optimiza-
tion of the welfare function (A.9) subject to (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7) determines
the state-contingent path of fiscal gap differentials {f˜dit }∞t=0, for all i ∈ [0, 1].
B.1 The Currency Area Problem
First order conditions are the following
p
λ
pi∗t + ψ
∗
pi,t = 0 (B.1)
(1 + ϕ)y˜∗t − λ(1 + ϕ)ψ∗pi,t + ψ∗r,t = 0 (B.2)
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t + λ
χ
1− χψ
∗
pi,t −
χ
1− χψ
∗
r,t = 0 (B.3)
together with the constraints (A.3) and (A.4), where ψ∗pi,t and ψ∗r,t are the la-
grange multipliers respectively associated to (A.3) and (A.4). The system can
be equivalently rewritten as
p
λ
pi∗t + ψ
∗
pi,t = 0 (B.4)
(1 + ϕ)y˜∗t − λ(1 + ϕ)ψ∗pi,t + ψ∗r,t = 0 (B.5)
f˜∗t = −y˜∗t − ϕ(y˜∗t + ppi∗t ) (B.6)
where (B.6) is the fiscal policy rule reported in the text, (6.1), and the first two
equations, given the solution that the central bank wants to implement, serve
the only purpose to determine lagrange multipliers.
B.2 The Representative Country Problem
The differential part of the fiscal optimization program is more involved than
the currency area problem, as, even restricting to Markov strategies, in any
stationary equilibrium endogenous variables depend on their own lags. This is
because the lagged values of fiscal and output gaps enter equation (A.6). As
an implication, expectations cannot be taken as given. Therefore, we conjecture
that the private sector forecasts future variables as linear functions of current
states for some arbitrary coefficients. At the rational expectation equilibrium,
those coefficients are defined to be such to coincide with the true fundamental
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parameters of the state space representation. To keep the problem tractable, we
substitute out inflation using its definition
pidit = p
di
t − pdit−1 (B.7)
and the fact that
ydit =
χ
1− χf
di
t −
[
pdit + (a
i
t − a∗t )
]
(B.8)
This allows to reduce the number of endogenous states, by replacing (A.6) with
(B.8). The equivalent optimization program features two controls, ydit and f
di
t ,
and an endogenous state, pdit . It is guessed that
pdit = c1p
di
t−1 + c2(a
i
t − a∗t ) + c3(µit − µ∗t ) (B.9)
equation (B.8) can be used in the Phillips curve to write fdit in terms of current
and past states only
f˜dit =
1− χ
χλϕ
[1 + β(1− c1) + λ(1 + ϕ)] pdit −
1− χ
χλϕ
pdit−1
+
1− χ
χλϕ
[λ(1 + ϕ)− βρc2] (ait − a∗t )
− 1− χ
χλϕ
(λ+ βρc3)(µit − µ∗t )
(B.10)
Plugging (B.10) back into (B.8) yields
y˜dit =
{
1
λϕ
[1 + β(1− c1) + λ(1 + ϕ)]− 1
}
pdit −
1
λϕ
pdit−1
+
{
1
λϕ
[λ(1 + ϕ)− βρc2]− 1
}
(ait − a∗t )
− 1
λϕ
(λ+ βρc3)(µit − µ∗t )
(B.11)
The problem consists in minimizing the value function
Vt = min
{
ε
λ
(pdit − pdit−1)2 + (1 + ϕ)(y˜dit )2 +
χ
1− χ(f˜
di
t )
2 + βEtVt+1
}
(B.12)
subject to (B.10) and (B.11). The corresponding first order condition is
2ε
λ
(pdit − pdit−1) + 2(1 + ϕ)
{
1
λϕ
[1 + β(1− c1) + λ(1 + ϕ)]− 1
}
y˜dit
+
2
λϕ
[1 + β(1− c1) + λ(1 + ϕ)] f˜dit + βEt
∂Vt+1
∂pt
= 0
(B.13)
Updating one period ahead the envelope condition
∂Vt
∂pt−1
= −2ε
λ
(pdit − pdit−1)−
2(1 + ϕ)
λϕ
y˜dit −
2
λϕ
f˜dit (B.14)
and substituting it in (B.13) yields equation (6.3) in the text.
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C Appendix: The Monetary Policy Prob-
lem
The central bank has to choose a state contingent path for the union-wide policy
outcomes
{
pi∗t , y˜∗t , f˜∗t
}∞
t=0
in order to maximize W ∗ subject to (4.4) and (B.6).
The nominal interest rate is chosen ex-post, consistently with the union-wide IS
equations. The associated first order conditions are
p
λ
piit +∆ξ
∗
pi,t + ϕpξ
∗
f,t = 0 (C.1)
(1 + ϕ)y˜∗t − λ(1 + ϕ)ξ∗pi,t + (1 + ϕ)ξ∗f,t = 0 (C.2)
χ
1− χf˜
∗
t + λ
χ
1− χξ
∗
pi,t + ξ
∗
f,t = 0 (C.3)
where ξ∗pi,t, ξ∗f,t are the lagrange multipliers respectively associated to (4.4) and
(B.6). (C.2) and (C.3) allow to express lagrange multipliers as functions of output
and fiscal gaps
ξ∗pi,t =
1− χ
λ
y˜∗t −
χ
λ
f˜∗t (C.4)
ξ∗f,t = −χ(y˜∗t + f˜∗t ) (C.5)
Substituting back into (C.1) yields the monetary policy rule (6.2) in the text.
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Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value
ϕ 3
p = w 6
θ 0.75
β 0.99
γ = χ 0.25
ρa 0.95
σε,a 0.0071
Table 2: Percentage standard deviations of union-wide variables in the case
of serially correlated cost-push shocks.Cost-push shock standard deviation is set
equal to TFP standard deviation.
ρ = 0.95 Inflation Output Gap Fiscal Gap Gov. Exp. Gap
Discretionary Fiscal 0.0451 0.4630 1.0845 0.6351
Full Commitment 0.0209 0.5093 0.5093 0
Table 3: Percentage standard deviations of union-wide variables in the case
of serially uncorrelated cost-push shocks. Cost-push shock standard deviation is
set equal to TFP standard deviation.
ρ = 0 Inflation Output Gap Fiscal Gap Gov. Exp. Gap
Discretionary Fiscal 0.0580 0.3301 0.4906 0.3548
Full Commitment 0.0621 0.3046 0.3046 0
Table 4: Percentage standard deviations of differentials. Cost-push shock stan-
dard deviation is set equal to TFP standard deviation.
ρ = 0.95 Inflation Output Gap Fiscal Gap Gov. Exp. Gap
Discretionary Fiscal 0.3748 0.6475 3.0429 2.7601
Full Commitment 0.3264 0.7384 3.4430 3.4526
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Table 5: Percentage standard deviations of differentials. Cost-push shock stan-
dard deviation is set equal to TFP standard deviation.
ρ = 0 Inflation Output Gap Fiscal Gap Gov. Exp. Gap
Discretionary Fiscal 0.3801 0.3719 2.8466 2.8205
Full Commitment 0.3399 0.3690 3.4473 3.4847
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a union-wide cost-push shock. Serial correlation
has been set to 0.95. Parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a union-wide cost-push. Serial correlation has
been set to 0. Parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a single-country TFP shock. Serial correlation
has been set to 0.95. Parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a single-country cost-push shock. Serial corre-
lation has been set to 0.95. Parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.
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Figure 5: Welfare cost of discretion. Contour sets of the welfare cost of discretion
as a function of cost-push shock serial correlation and relative standard deviation.
Welfare cost is measured in consumption equivalents, i.e. as the percentage decrease
of steady state consumption under full commitment in order to be indifferent to the
fiscal discretion regime.
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Figure 6: Welfare cost of discretion: union-wide component. The graph displays
contour sets of the union-wide component as a fraction of the total cost of discretion.
The cost is measured in consumption equivalents.
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Figure 7: Welfare gain from committed fiscal policy. The gain is computed
with respect to inactive fiscal policy, i.e. a regime where fiscal policy is constrained to
efficient provision of public goods.
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Figure 8: Welfare gain from discretionary fiscal policy. The gain is computed
with respect to inactive fiscal policy.
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Figure 9: Welfare gain from discretionary fiscal policy: union-wide compo-
nent.
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Figure 10: Welfare gain from discretionary fiscal policy: differential compo-
nent.
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